And why do anything at all with remote electronic voting (hereinafter DEG)? Modern, technologically advanced and even environmentally friendly: fewer trees are cut down for ballot paper. Praises are sung to it from every corner, voters enjoy the simplicity and convenience: you can vote at the touch of a button and do not need to go anywhere. Everything would be fine, but you need to understand that behind the beautiful idea lies the dishonesty of the customers of the DEG, who did not at all set themselves the goal of holding democratic elections in Russia.
In fact, the DEG is a tool that expands the ability of the voter to exercise active suffrage. But the quality of this tool, its reliability and compliance with the principles of suffrage depends on what technologies are used, how it is done, and how the DEG is created, implemented and used.
The history of the modern Russian DEG began in 2019, when the intention to use it in elections in Russia was first publicly announced. It is important to mention that up to this point there have already been attempts to introduce DEG, which hardly anyone will remember now.
Experiments on the use of DEG were carried out in selected regions in 2008–2009.1 The first was an online survey in the Tula region, in which one could participate using a computer and a special disk.2 According to the creators of the experiment, they adopted the methodology in advance, trained the organizers and conducted an information campaign for voters. The results of the experiment were recognized as successful and promising for municipal elections, but in the end they were not used.
In 2009, an experiment using different DEG technologies was carried out in five constituent entities of the Russian Federation.3 In one experiment, respondents participated in the survey by voting on a mobile phone, in another, through an information kiosk, using a special social payment card, and in three others, the 2008 experiment was repeated with a special voting disk.4 According to the organizers, the experiments went well: experts were involved in the preparation, citizens were comprehensively informed, all the principles of the electoral right were observed, and at the end sociological surveys were conducted and the opinion of the voters was revealed.
Now it is difficult to say how much of this is true, and what is the embellishment of reality for a beautiful report. Despite seemingly successful results, the experiments were consigned to oblivion. Nevertheless, election commissions should learn from their own experience: even on the formal side, with modern experiments using DEG, even half of what was tested during the “rehearsals” of 2008–2009 was not done.
After that, DEG was forgotten for 10 years. It is difficult to say why it was in 2019 that the authorities again showed interest in this tool, but the fact remains: in March, at the Moscow Civil Forum, they started talking about conducting an experiment on the use of DEG in the next elections to the Moscow City Duma. Most likely, by this time the voting system had already been developed, and it was impossible to create a workable system in seven months. But a rhetorical question arises: why did no one know about this? Why were future voters, candidates and observers confronted with the fact that a completely new and untested method of voting was used in real elections? The organizers a priori assumed that the result of the experiment would be successful, although in reality it could be unsuccessful. Obviously, the goal was to implement the DEG at any cost, and this became clear both from the information campaign, more reminiscent of pre-election campaigning, and from the final results, which with a high probability deprived at least one candidate of his seat.5
Nevertheless, this is how the first modern DEG system, the Moscow one, appeared. In September 2019, it was used in three constituencies in the elections to the Moscow City Duma.
The Moscow system is the brainchild of the Department of Information Technology of the city of Moscow and Kaspersky Lab.6 The CEC of Russia could not remain indifferent to the success of its regional colleagues and in October 2019 decided to develop its own DEG system as part of the new version of the governmental automated system (GAS) “Vybory.” And again, its development remained a mystery to all potentially interested parties. Thus, opacity has been a feature of Russian DEG systems since their inception, although perhaps the system designers simply interpreted the secrecy of the vote too broadly.
The second, federal, voting system is being developed by PJSC Rostelecom and Waves Enterprise.7 It was first used in 2020 in the voting on amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation.8
In 2021, the Moscow and federal systems were used on a single voting day in elections at all levels, from municipal to federal. In the future, the Moscow system may lose competition from the federal one, because, according to the chairman of the CEC of Russia, the DEG will be used only on the federal platform.9
DEG systems enjoy unprecedented popularity among voters: their turnout is consistently over 90%,10 despite the fact that, for example, in the elections to the State Duma in 2021, the total turnout was only 47.71%.11 It is not clear why the DEG has become such a statistical anomaly—because of the unprecedented convenience of voting12 or its use as a way to coerce state employees.13
Thus, today two DEG systems are used in Russia: federal and Moscow.14 The technologies used in the systems are different, but both use blockchain.15
Blockchain16 is based on the distrust of database participants in each other, on the idea that proof of the correctness of the recorded information is provided by the correct operation of mathematical algorithms without human intervention.17 The advent of technology marked the possibility of the withering away of the controlling function of the state.18 State control accompanies us from birth to death, testifies to our financial victories and defeats, from a successful real estate transaction to bankruptcy. It traditionally acts as an intermediary and witness to many events in the life of a citizen, including in the field of his rights and obligations, as well as changes in legal status. But what if a mathematical algorithm is much more reliable than an entry in state registers, because the blockchain will save all the information, won’t confuse anything, won’t forget, and won’t take a bribe?
Blockchain is transforming areas traditionally riddled with government regulation. Systems for registering property rights are being created,19 technology is being introduced into the work of notaries, and in some ways it completely replaces them.20
The complete withering away of the state and the worldwide spread of blockchain technology still look like a utopia. States are not ready to give power to technology. But the blockchain has already created the ability for many people and organizations to create horizontal connections, as well as use cryptocurrencies. The latter circumstance should be recognized as very sensitive for a state that rules over citizens, including through control over the national currency.
The developers of Russian DEG systems loudly declare the use of blockchain technology in elections, the invulnerability and irreplaceability of votes. But, unfortunately, this technology is still not a panacea. Its use alone cannot ensure that all principles of suffrage, such as the secrecy of the vote, are observed. Practice shows that even such worth of a blockchain as transparency and verifiability can be completely levelled if two blockchains are used at the same time, and only one of them is accessible.
The creation and implementation of the DEG is a creative and innovative process, where there are no clear instructions on which technologies are right to use and which are not. DEG regulation will also differ from country to country. At the international level, the only clear guideline for the development, implementation and application of the DEG are Recommendations No. CM / Rec (2017) 5 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe “On the rules of electronic voting”21 (hereinafter referred to as the Recommendations). They generally describe the following DEG standards: the need to comply with the principles of suffrage and how to comply with them; organizational rules for the introduction and application of the DEG; standards of openness and transparency regarding the DEG system and its application; requirements for regular testing of the DEG system; requirements for the reliability and safety of the DEG system.
Additionally, the contents of the Recommendations are disclosed by the Explanatory Memorandum22 and Methodological Guides23 to them.
When developing, implementing and using the DEG, the principles of suffrage and organizational standards must be observed as follows.24
The principle of universal suffrage: it is necessary to create a simple and understandable voting interface and ensure that persons with disabilities can vote independently.
The principle of equal suffrage: it is necessary to ensure the unique identification of voters; provide access to voting only after authentication; securely store the cast vote and prevent double voting.
The principle of free participation in elections: it is unacceptable to unlawfully influence the will of the voter directly or through the voting system; the voting system must ensure that the voter has the opportunity to cast a valid vote and ensure that it has been taken into account in determining the results of the vote.
Secret ballot: the secrecy of electronic voting is ensured at all its stages; the entire voting process must be such that it is impossible to tracethe connection between the voter and his vote; the vote must be and remain anonymous; disclosure of information about how and for whom voters voted before the end of voting is unacceptable.
Regulatory and organizational requirements: the introduction of electronic voting should be gradual and consistent; legislation needs to be changed before implementation; e-elections should be overseen by election administrations; the counting of votes must be available for observation.
Transparency and Observation: The e-voting system must be capable of being observed and verified; components of the voting system are disclosed for verification and certification; citizens are informed in advance about how the system works and how they can vote using it.
Accountability: it is necessary to develop technical, evaluation and certification requirements for the e-voting system, based on democratic principles and standards; carry out official certification before each use of the system; and ensure an open and comprehensive audit of the voting system.
Reliability and safety: before using, you need to make sure that the e-voting system is genuine and works correctly; all votes must be encrypted; the voting system should detect invalid votes.
What is the ideal DEG system from the point of view of the Council of Europe? Such a system is developed openly and gradually, with the involvement of external experts and the public. Certified and tested before each election. Legal regulation is developed and adopted in advance. All necessary information and documentation is published at least one year before the election. The DEG system itself ensures compliance with the principles of the electoral law, both in terms of the voting process, and in terms of the interface and technologies used.
Already at first glance, it is noticeable that the Russian DEG systems fundamentally do not correspond to the ideals. On closer examination, one can say that the DEG is an instrument of electoral authoritarianism, hiding behind the mask of democracy and modern technology. More on this later.
The legislative regulation of DEG is inconsistent and insufficient. On May 22, 2019, a corresponding law of the city of Moscow was adopted to conduct an experiment with the Moscow system.25 However, the federal law,26 on the basis of which the regional law was supposed to be adopted, came into force only on May 29, 2019. Thus, a paradoxical situation has arisen when the federal law, on the basis of which the regional one is adopted, was adopted later than it was. This fact demonstrates the grossest disregard for the rules of lawmaking and the decorative role of the State Duma: it blindly obeyed the Moscow initiative and without question turned over the regulation of electoral rights and freedoms of citizens to the regional level.
Being a witness to the events described, the author can assert that the deputies did not understand what they were voting for, whether the DEG system was democratic, and did not seek to find out. On the one hand, the eternal haste, and on the other hand, the disregard for the rights and freedoms of voters led to the experiment on the DEG in 2019, which was extremely poor in terms of the quality of legal regulation. When announcing the experiment, the creation of technical and legal groups involved in its preparationwas announced. However, the second group was never created, and no one discussed with lawyers the features and problematic aspects of the regulation of the DEG. The technical team included both information technology specialists and a few lawyers, including the author of these lines. As a result, legal issues faded into the background.
In addition, the DEG is regulated mainly at the sub-legislative level, by acts of election commissions. In the elections in 2021, it was determined27 that the DEG can be applied in cases and in the manner established by the CEC of Russia.28 The situation is similar in the 2019 elections. Then the federal law transferred the regulation of the DEG to the law of the city of Moscow. In turn, the Moscow law almost completely transferred the regulation to the Moscow City Electoral Commission (hereinafter referred to as MGIK). So the regulation of the rights and freedoms of man and citizen, which is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Russian Federation,29 was reduced to the level of an election commission of a constituent entity of the Russian Federation, which did not and could not have such powers. Such a crude illegal delegation shows that constitutional rights and freedoms mean nothing if the end justifies the means.
The federal and regional parliaments have shown complete unwillingness and inability to perform their functions. As spokesmen for the people’s will, they were obliged to act in the interests of citizens, to ensure that rights and freedoms would be protected and observed. The situation with the regulation of the DEG once again confirms that the parliament, which has lost a sense of responsibility to the voters, supports and reproduces the worst non-democratic practices. In the situation under consideration, in reality, only the election commissions and executive authorities had power, in whose interests it was to strengthen their own power.
Normative legal acts, as well as the decisions themselves to introduce DEG systems, were adopted less than a year before the elections and did not allow the participants in the electoral process to adapt to the new method of voting.
For example, in 2019, a little less than seven months passed from the public proposal to conduct an experiment with DEG to the actual experiment. In the same year, the last of the Moscow City Election Commission decisions, regulating the issues of openness, transparency and monitoring of the DEG, was taken just 16 days before the voting day. Naturally, within such a time frame it was impossible to qualitatively prepare for the observation.
The source code for the Moscow system was released on July 17, 2019 (that is, less than two months before the election) so that external experts could test the system and try to find vulnerabilities.30 Some of them were found, but, as it became clear later, this did not make the system reliable enough. The organizers of the experiment deliberately jeopardized the elections in those constituencies where the experiment was conducted.
In 2021, the CEC of Russia adopted the procedure for holding the DEG about two months before the elections. Disclosure of technical documentation on the federal system also began two months before Election Day. This situation does not comply with the Recommendations, according to which documentation should be available in advance, that is, a year before the elections. Otherwise, experts, observers and the public cannot react, and give their comments and assessment. The source code of the federal system was released to the public in September 2021,31 18 days before voting day—an extremely short time for any reaction and evaluation.
An outrageous trend is repeated from time to time: the developers and organizers of the DEG set an impossible task for experts and observers: to check and evaluate something in a very short time and with incomplete access to information. This practice means one thing: another fiction, an imitation of the observance of the principle of publicity and openness. Such tight deadlines appear not only as a mockery of experts and observers, but also as another round of enmity between the state and civil society.
Of course, such abbreviated time periods for the development and implementation of the DEG have a bad effect on its reliability and stability. There are at least two known failures in the operation of the Moscow system that occurred during voting: in 2019, in the elections to the Moscow City Duma (resulting in the inability to vote for several hours)32 and in 2021, in the elections to the State Duma (difficulties arose during transcription of votes).33 It is not entirely clear to what extent the rights of voters and candidates were affected in both cases. One of the candidates doubted the result of the electronic voting and filed a lawsuit to cancel it, but was unsuccessful.34 At the same time, a case requiring the involvement of experts, special knowledge and special expertise was considered in just one court session.
The cases of failure showed not only the unreliability of the Moscow DEG system, but also the helplessness of the election commissions in such situations. In fact, when using the DEG, the organizers of electronic voting were the developers of the DEG systems and the executive authorities. Only they were able to solve emerging problems even though lacking the necessary legal status. In 2019, one could observe many hours of failure in the operation of the DEG system and how the members of the commission did not understand what was happening and could not influence anything.35 Representatives of the Department of Information Technologies of the city of Moscow during this situation tried to fix the voting system, without being members of the commission, without any authority, but in fact being the only participants in the process with the right to influence the development of events. The functions of the election commission were reduced to the formal signing of protocols on the results of voting, without understanding how these results were obtained, and without analyzing the possible violation of the rights of voters and candidates, for whom the DEG remains opaque.
Oversight of the DEG requires special technical knowledge, but there is no special training for observers that provides sufficient skills. Anyone can become an observer, but only technical specialists can really even try to understand what is happening during the voting. Due to the need to have special training, the number of qualified electronic observers is small, and the quality of DEG observation is significantly reduced. In addition, observation tools themselves are insufficient, even for specialists. The programmer and observer Petr Zhizhin noted that in the elections in 2021, the proposed tools were only a “showcase” of voting and did not reflect the processes taking place inside the systems.36 Unfortunately, even legal surveillance tools may be inaccessible to observers if the authorities simply do not let them in.37
The blockchain used in the DEG systems was only partly transparent. After the 2021 elections, it turned out that there is a public blockchain, where information can be recorded, as well as a private blockchain, inaccessible to observers,38 information from which was never published. At the same time, the most important property of this technology is decentralization, when all information about the voting process is recorded on various independent devices. However, in Russia they are all in the hands of the state, which creates the possibility of rolling back the voting results and replacing part of the database.39
The DEG can be a democratic, reliable and transparent voting instrument, if the whole electoral system is like that. If it is sick with authoritarianism, then DEG is also infected. Russia’s modern DEG systems are non-transparent and undemocratic, and authorities at various levels are doing everything to keep them that way.
In January 2022, a bill introducing legislative regulation of the DEG was submitted to the State Duma for consideration. However, in terms of content, it did not consolidate any conceptually important provisions and principles, confining itself to giving great legal force to the norms previously adopted by the CEC of Russia and the Moscow City Election Commission. As before, election commissions will be empowered to regulate key aspects of the DEG with no time limits for the adoption of acts. This means that, most likely, the trend of adopting and publishing significant acts and documentation on the eve of the elections, in violation of the principle of stability of the electoral system, will continue.
The draft law did not describe the operationla algorithm of the DEG system in any way, nor did it regulate access to it. It also did not solve the problem of monitoring and did not give the members of the election commissions the opportunities and tools to control the operation of the system. There is no legal certainty, no control, no openness and transparency, and no guarantees of voting rights.
The bill was sharply criticized by experts who, in their reviews, called it unacceptable in its entirety40 or requiring significant revision. Based on the feedback, the experts prepared a package of amendments for the second reading of the bill and sent it to deputies of different factions.In the event, all amendments were rejected.
During the second reading, a terrible situation happenedwith the bill, albeit typical for Russian laws: it was crammed with amendments that had nothing to do with the original concept. From a very weak DEG bill, it has become a 155-page monster, which complicates election observation, introduces new barriers to nominating candidates, and creates a register of “natural person foreign agents” with all the ensuing consequences. The norms on the DEG have practically not changed compared to the first reading, consolidating the already established undemocratic tendencies.
There are no words to describe how undemocratic, absurd and repressive the new amendments are, or what brutal and ruthless violence is being conducted as part of the legislative process.
Before making a decision about the possibility or impossibility of using the DEG in elections in Russia, it is necessary to conduct a thorough review of what has already been done and used. Recommendations of the Council of Europe can serve as a reference point in this process. At the same time, it must be admitted that there is no universal solution for organizing the work of the DEG system, but there is a way through which such a solution can be found and implemented. It is necessary to start moving in this direction with the involvement of experts and the public in the discussion of undoubtedly progressive technology, with the search for agreement between political forces.
The most important milestone on this path should be the decision of an independent parliament on the future of the DEG in Russia. Only it has the right to decide whether the system is ready for use in the form and context in which it is presented at the time of voting, whether it meets democratic standards or is not capable of guaranteeing the realization of the rights of all participants in the electoral process. And it may turn out that even if voters have confidence in the DEG system, parliament will decide not to use it if it is not sufficiently reliable and democratic, as the Norwegian parliament did in 2014.41
When conducting DEG, members of election commissions and observers should be able to independently check all stages of remote electronic voting without special knowledge. This is an ideal to strive for and bring to life as much as possible. However, it is likely that with the use of the DEG, elections will no longer be the business of lawyers and bureaucrats. Observers and members of election commissions will need to have at least a minimal understanding of the technical side of electronic voting, which means that, with the participation of experts, it will be necessary to develop and conduct special training. Only with a thorough understanding of the principle of operation of the DEG and awareness of the essence of the tools and procedures for verification, will members of election commissions cease to be mere window dressing. Undoubtedly, technical specialists, experts, and observers will also need to be involved in the development of monitoring tools. Specific tools will depend on the availability of technology, the needs of the observing community, and the actual ability to meet them.
The review process might look like this:
suspend the use of DEG in Russia;
make available as much documentation and information related to the DEG as possible;
involve observers and experts in the discussion and verification of the DEG, formalize their status and powers;
initiate public discussion;
develop domestic standards (based on international ones) for the DEG system;
conduct a public audit of technology systems, as well as a review of DEG legislation for compliance with domestic and international standards;
conduct public testing of DEG systems, sum up its results;
conduct public opinion polls;
provide Parliament with all the information necessary to make a decision on use or non-use;
if the decision is positive, then develop a plan for the introduction of DEG;
finalize the legislation on DEG;
implement the updated DEG gradually, starting with municipal elections;
analyze each experience of using DEG and refine the system;
be ready to abandon the DEG and return to paper voting if the system fails pre-election checks;
update DEG standards and regularly update the system to counter new vulnerabilities.
This entire process, most likely, will take more than one year. But haste is inappropriate when it comes to democratic elections. The DEG should not create barriers to the exercise of voting rights, and changes are possible only if the principles of interaction between the state and citizens are reviewed, as well as careful observance of the principle of openness and publicity as one of the key principles in the process of creating and using the DEG.
The future of the Russian electoral system may well be tied to this technology as the main voting tool, provided it is brought up to the highest standards. In turn, the implementation of this requirement is possible only in the conditions of a free, democratic and technologically developed Russia, and at the current moment we are forced to state one thing: the current state of DEG technology makes it completely unsuitable for use.