Chapter 5. Classification of Amendments to the Electoral Legislation as a Marker of a Change in the Political Regime (Goals and Objectives of the Authorities)

Significance of the classification of amendments for the study of the dynamics of political regimes

We have already said that it is the electoral system and electoral legislation (its legal expression) that are the magic key that, depending on the goals and objectives of the government, opens or closes the doors of democracy. It is on the electoral legislation and on elections as a result of its implementation that the qualitative state, limits and possibilities of representative bodies depend—institutions that not only form the rules of the game, but also limit the executive power as the most potentially authoritarian. This means that it is precisely this, the electoral legislation, that ultimately determines the effectiveness of the system of separation of powers, and the configuration, essence, content and procedure for the interaction of all state institutions.

But exactly for the same reason, as we said again, electoral legislation is the main risk group when changing power priorities. The vicious authoritarian circle of looped causal relationships, when in order to be elected one must have power, and in order to have power one must be elected, requires special foolproof rules of the political game, the main one of which is the method of the organization and conduct of elections. Democracy provides freedom of choice, but does not guarantee the indispensable choice of consistently democratic leaders. An autocrat cannot allow such a situation. He only needs a victory for the sake of retaining power, and the specially designed conditions for this victory will certainly be fixed in the electoral legislation. Therefore, if the legislative blocking of the possibility of a democratic change of power begins, it is time to raise the question of the transformation of the political regime. That is, we assume that the assessment of the dynamics of the political regime should begin with an assessment of the transformation of electoral legislation and related institutions. That is the hypothesis.

We have recorded that a total of 2,630 amendments were made to the electoral legislation of Russia over the past quarter of a century. Including only since May 2021, 166 changes have been made, and the number of versions of the Law “On Basic Guarantees…” has exceeded one hundred. This is a huge, hard to perceive and, at first glance, chaotic set of norms, clarifications, and additions to them. Amendments were made gradually over a long period of time. Sometimes it seemed that they were purely tactical in nature and were due to the momentary need for a specific political alignment before the next election cycle. However, looking back and having the whole array of information before our eyes, we understand that this is not so. The whole seemingly chaotic complex of minor and major corrections fits perfectly into a precise system that allows you to see the internal logic and main goals of the political transformations.

The first task of classification is the systematization of a huge volume of material, which makes it possible to see a clearly traceable pattern behind the apparent chaos.

The second task, which naturally follows from the first one, is to determine the qualitative features of this pattern and the correlation of features with the conclusions of already conducted scholarly research to strengthen its evidence base or, conversely, to refute it.

The third task is to hypothesize that this classification can be used as a gauge for future research. We have analyzed the amendments in conditions when we already fully understood the authoritarian vector of the country’s development. Our classification harmoniously coincided with the conclusions of political scientists, and then we thought: “What if we use it the other way around”? Is it possible to measure the deviations of political regimes from the democratic vector with the help of a ready-made classification of authoritarian amendments? Let’s say in some country there appears an amendment from the groups we have formed. Is it a wake-up call, indicating an anti-democratic deformation of the regime, a change in the goals and objectives of the authorities, which have not yet manifested themselves clearly? We assume that such a systematic analysis according to various criteria could become a commonly used marker that would preventively, rather than post factum, allow revealing the hidden intentions of the authorities. Giving a classification of amendments to the electoral legislation, the adoption of which ultimately allows transforming the democratic goals of the development of the state and democratic institutions into their opposite, we offer an additional tool for studying political and legal phenomena and processes. Moreover, if we had other material for analysis, we would be able to create an appropriate marker using this method for a reverse assessment of the transition from authoritarianism to democracy.

We put forward a hypothesis that a meaningful classification of amendments to the electoral legislation can be a marker for determining the true goals and objectives of the authorities and the corresponding transformation of the political regime. “Those who have ears, let them hear, those who have eyes, let them see”… The meaning of this ancient saying is that the truth is with us. In The Logic of Scientific Inquiry, Karl Popper argues that in order for a theory to be empirically validated, it must be shown to be useful in predicting future events.1 Therefore, life and research conducted using it should prove the effectiveness of this tool, if it is in demand by someone. Today, this is especially true for post-socialist states that are still going through difficult transitional processes of adaptation to democracy and the development of democratic values. In this case, Russia is taken as a model, since its electoral system has quantitatively and qualitatively undergone the most wholesale transformation.

Let us stipulate at the outset that in addition to direct amendments to the electoral laws, there are many other ways of transforming the electoral legislation and the electoral field. For example, the interpretation of legal norms by constitutional control bodies; replacing the law with quasi-normative acts (instructions, guidelines, etc.) and making these acts mandatory; precedential decisions of courts of general jurisdiction and the creation on their basis of sustainable judicial practice; arbitrary administrative law enforcement that creates a system of business customs (common law), etc. All these methods should be the subject of a special analysis, and they will certainly be considered separately. In this case, we deliberately limit ourselves to the content-subject classification of direct legislative amendments.

It should also be emphasized that throughout the entire period of the Russian Constitution of 1993, we observe two multidirectional and clearly separated trends in time. The period of “defective” democracy is very different from the twenty-year period of formation and consolidation of authoritarianism. If from 1993 to 2001 the opportunities for participants in the electoral process gradually expanded,2 then from 2000–2001 we see a growing reverse process. If before 2000 the legislative framework was formed to combat fraud and other dirty election technologies, then in the course of the subsequent transformation, most of these provisions were canceled or furnished with additional clauses and conditions and thus neutralized. Moreover, special regulations were introduced, opening up scope for making it difficult to exercise oversight of the electoral process and creating prerequisites for the spread of dirty administrative practices. The first period was quite suddenly artificially interrupted by a change in the government’s goal-setting. The volume of transformational material of this period is clearly insufficient for reliable conclusions about the dynamics of democratic transition. Therefore, we will analyze the amendments made to the Russian electoral legislation over the past 20 years. It was during these years that the authoritarian transition went through almost all of its stages right up to the border of a closed dictatorship (here the definitions can vary). And we believe that the existing condition is quite suitable for a full-fledged analysis.

The subject classification of the amendments made to the electoral legislation since 2000 makes it possible to group them in several areas of focus. Firstly, by the targeted impact on the competitive political environment, in which, in fact, the voters really evaluate their preferences in relation to politicians. Secondly, in terms of the impact on the transparency and credible effectiveness of elections. A finer adjustment of the researcher’s vision makes it possible to see which amendments are characteristic of the stage of seizing power, and which are characteristic of an authoritarian regime during the period when it goes on the defensive (consolidation) in order to maintain positions of power. And this time adjustment is very close to the estimates of political scientists.

So, almost all amendments can be assigned to one of six main groups:

• amendments restricting free and equal access to elections for collective and individual participants;

• amendments limiting the equality of subjects of the electoral process;

• amendments aimed at integrating election commissions into the system of executive authorities;

• amendments neutralizing the possibility of public oversight of elections;

• amendments transforming the electoral system as a whole and the formula for the distribution of deputy mandates; and

• near-electoral amendments.

Let’s consider them in more detail.

Limitation of the makeup and possibilities of collective participants in the elections

The first, most extensive, group of amendments concerns the legislative restriction of free and equal access to elections by narrowing the circle of participants in the electoral process. It includes several subgroups of amendments.

The limitation of the makeup and possibilities of collective participants in the elections consisted of the following:

• limiting the participation of regional parties in federal elections, later liquidating regional and interregional parties as a struggle against competitors in a complex multipart federal state;

• a ban on electoral blocs which reduced the chances of participation in elections by small parties;

• exclusion from the list of subjects (actors) in the electoral process of all public associations except for political parties;

• new legislation on parties, a radical change in the volume of the political field and its actors, and the exclusion from the list of subjects of the electoral process of most small parties in the framework of a falsely formulated idea about the possibility of building an effective and regulated party system from above;

• the complication of the conditions and procedures for the administrative registration of political parties, which led to a sharp decrease in their numbers;

• an increase in formal requirements for parties and the strengthening of state regulation became an additional mechanism for the state to influence “undesirable parties,” which made it possible not to register them and not allow them to participate in elections;

• the subsequent forced reduction (after the decision of the ECtHR) of the requirements for the minimum membership in parties did not lift the restrictions on the participation of small parties in elections, since the ban on electoral blocs remained;

• the adoption of the Law “On Counteracting Extremist Activities” and the introduction on its basis of an extrajudicial practice of recognizing public organizations as extremist with the aim of subsequently preventing single-seat candidates associated with them from participating in elections;

• amending the Law on Non-Commercial Organizations to limit their political activity under the threat of being recognized as foreign agents.

All these restrictions were primarily implemented through the transformation of the legislation on political parties in an organic combination with the election legislation. In parallel, amendments were made to corresponding laws and laws establishing procedures and restrictions on activities of collective participants in the political process (the referendum, on public events, etc.).

Most of the changes from this group refer to the initial period of modern Russian authoritarianism, that is, to the period of its formation and seizure of power, when the autocracy formed the political system “for itself.” However, amendments that complicate the registration of parties, and peculiar legal refinements such as extremist organizations, foreign agents, a very vague definition of political activity and political proactivity appeared at the stage of consolidation as a potential manoeuvre in case of a sharpening of political confrontation. And these amendments did not come into full force immediately—their legal lameness at the time of adoption did not yet fully correspond to the state of the law enforcement and judicial systems. When the system “ripened” after the amendments to the Constitution, then they flourished in full bloom.

Limitation of the extent of individual participants in elections

This is a particularly interesting position among all the groups of amendments. Remember how elegantly this task was solved in the USSR after the state abolished the function of dictatorship and class restrictions on active suffrage? In the Constitution of the USSR of 1936, along with the proclamation of universal, equal, direct suffrage,3 it was written: “Work in the USSR is the duty and a matter of honor of every citizen capable of working, according to the principle: ‘he who does not work, does not eat’”(Article 12). And if he doesn’t eat, then he can’t make decisions. And he has no opportunity to nominate his own candidates, or himself to run for the Soviets. Not because it is forbidden, but simply because only labor collectives can nominate candidates for deputies.

In modern Russia, restrictions look less elegant. And this is understandable, since they all belong to the period when authoritarianism passed into the stage of consolidation (retention of power). Initially, they looked like a selective fight with political opponents. But for any authoritarian government, as it is artificially extended, the number of opponents increases, and qualitatively they become more sophisticated in their strategy and tactics, since the conditions for political competition become more complicated by law. The consequence of the departure from the political arena of the majority of collective participants was an increase in the activity of individual participants—strong politicians and activists who have authority among voters. To establish control over this process, the legislator took the path of direct and indirect restrictions. Direct restrictions consisted in the establishment of a number of electoral qualifications. As is well known, the Constitution provides for only two possible grounds for depriving a citizen of a passive electoral right: being in a place of deprivation of liberty pursuant to a guilty verdict of a court, and a declaration of a citizen’s incompetence by a court.

But, starting from 2006, the electoral legislation began to be actively supplemented with various types of restrictions.

1. One of the grounds for deprivation of passive suffrage was the fact that a Russian citizen has foreign citizenship or a residence permit or a similar document giving the right to permanent residence in a foreign state (2006).4 The amendments ignored the constitutional principles of equality of rights and freedoms of citizens and the prohibition of restricting rights depending on whether a Russian citizen has foreign citizenship.5 As of 2015, the Russian Federal Migration Service estimated the number of Russian citizens holding foreign citizenship or residence permits at about five million people.6 Thus, about 2% of Russian citizens were excluded from participation in the electoral process as candidates, mostly the most politically and economically active, with a fairly high level of education and income.

2. Under the slogan of “fighting crime in power,” a restriction was introduced for persons with an unexpunged or outstanding conviction for grave or especially grave crimes (2006).7 Here, there is a certain correlation between the introduction of this restriction and a number of high-profile (mostly so-called “frame-up” economic) criminal cases under articles for grave and especially grave crimes, which involved opposition politicians, human rights activists, corruption fighters and other public figures. Some of these cases, in which the ECtHR found a violation of human rights established by the European Convention, are not reviewed under any pretext or are reviewed purely formally, without taking into account the comments of the ECtHR and changes in sentences.8 Based on the fact that about 350,000 people9 are convicted of grave and especially grave crimes every year, several million Russians have lost the right to run for office for a long time.

3. Some time later, the legislator considered the restrictions imposed only for the time until the expungement and canceling of a criminal record insufficient, and a complete ban was introduced to apply to persons who had ever been convicted of grave or especially grave crimes,10 that is, in fact, it was a question of lifetime deprivation of passive suffrage. The amendment was retroactively applied to all those ever convicted of serious or especially serious crimes.11

4. The limitation of passive suffrage was the presence of conviction for certain elements of crimes. The first among the “non-nominees” were citizens convicted of crimes of an “extremist orientation” and having an unexpunged or outstanding conviction for them (2010).12 Introducing this rule, the parliamentarians did not bother with a more precise wording, without taking into account the fact that the special part of the Russian Criminal Code does not contain such a chapter at all. That is, conditions were artificially created for the widest administrative discretion in determining the extent of persons limited in passive suffrage.

5. Restrictions on passive suffrage also affected those who were subjected to liability for certain administrative offenses—propaganda and public display of Nazi paraphernalia and symbols and for the production and distribution of extremist materials (2010).13 And this is quite understandable, since bringing to administrative responsibility is procedurally simpler and more efficient. In addition, the Constitution and the norms of the Code of Administrative Offenses provide a person adjudged administratively liable with a smaller amount of legal guarantees. In other words, it is easier to subject a person to administrative punishment than to convict him for a criminal offense, which makes it possible to relatively quickly, if necessary, “deprive” any citizen of his passive electoral right.

6. In May 2021, the Duma introduced further amendments to the Law “On Basic Guarantees…” and the Law “On Elections…”, on a ban on the participation in elections of persons involved in extremist and terrorist organizations. The people immediately called this document a law “against the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK).” As a result, if by June 2021 experts estimated the number of those “deprived” of passive suffrage at 9 million people (8% of voters), then by the beginning of 2022 the Golos movement (recognized as a foreign agent) in its report stated an increase in their number to 10 to 11 million people (10% of voters)14.

Indirect restrictions on passive suffrage

Such restrictions are procedural in nature and are tied to the stages of the electoral process. For example, in 2002, the possibility of nominating candidates by a group of voters was excluded from the electoral legislation.15 After the introduction of this amendment, candidates were left with only two options—nomination by an electoral association or self-nomination. In 2005, when the electoral system was changed from a mixed majoritarian-proportional system to a purely proportional one, the right to self-nomination was also eliminated. So, in practice, non-party citizens were deprived of passive suffrage. And although they still had the opportunity to “submit an application” to a political party with a request to include them in the list of candidates, this procedure made them completely dependent on the will of the party leadership.

Another indirect limitation on passive suffrage was the five-fold reduction in the maximum percentage of possible defects when checking signature sheets, introduced in 2005. At the same time, the allowable limit of the “reserve” signatures that could be handed over in excess of those required for registration was also reduced from 25 to 10% of their required number.16 As a result, the already complicated procedure for collecting signatures became practically insurmountable for self-nominated candidates and for political parties whose participation in the elections could be considered undesirable for one reason or another. According to V.L. Sheinis, “in practice, it is not difficult for the state to reject practically any number of signatures for a variety of reasons.”17 At the same time, there is no effective procedure for contesting the results of verification of signatures. This procedure for registering candidates has been criticized more than once from various quarters. During the mass protest actions that took place after the elections of the State Duma of the Russian Federation of the 6th convocation, its cancellation was one of the main demands of the protesters. As a result, the legislator made a kind of “concession” and in 2012 completely exempted all political parties from collecting signatures in any election, except for the election of the President of the Russian Federation.18 But such an amendment, which expands the possibilities of political competition, turned out to be extremely inconvenient and even dangerous for the authorities. It literally destroyed the whole conveniently arranged scheme of limiting the participation of collective actors in the political struggle. Therefore, two years later, everything returned to normal—the mandatory collection of signatures returned to elections at all levels, up to municipal ones. Exceptions concerned only the parties whose lists received mandates in the current composition of the legislative assemblies of the constituent entities of the Federation. Thus, the state almost completely regained control over the process of registering candidates and their lists in federal elections.

Creating an uneven playing field
for the participants of the election campaign

The second group of amendments is aimed at creating unequal conditions for participants in the election campaign. We are talking about a specially created system of advantages for some participants in the electoral process and, conversely, creating obstacles for others. In most cases, these advantages and barriers relate to campaigning and election finance issues. But not only.

A striking example of creating advantages is the introduction of the so-called “preferential registration” regime, when political parties admitted to the distribution of deputy mandates in previous elections of the same or higher level were exempted from collecting signatures when nominating candidates and lists of candidates.19 As a result, these parties and their candidates saved a significant amount of financial resources and always had the advantage of starting the campaign earlier than others. The legislator cunningly substantiated this initiative by the need to support parties “that are popular among voters.” However, in this case, the deputies found themselves in the role of judges in their own case— they created special preferences for their own parliamentary parties.

In addition to the rule on registration inequality, a state funding mechanism was created for parties that received a certain percentage of votes in previous elections. The provision on state financing of political parties that won at least 3% of the vote in the last elections to the State Duma or won at least twelve single-mandate constituencies was provided for in the very first version of the Law “On Political Parties”, adopted in July 2001.20 These parties received annual funding of 0.005 of the minimum wage (50 kopecks) for each vote received.21 The party received the same amount in a lump sum for the result of the candidate nominated by it for the President of the Russian Federation, if he scored three or more percent of the vote.22 Since then, the amount of funding has changed repeatedly and always upwards. So, in 2005, the “price of a vote” increased tenfold, up to 5 rubles,23 in 2008 by another four times, up to 20 rubles,24 in 2012, up to 50 rubles,25 in 2014, up to 110 rubles per vote,26 and usually this took place within one year of the last election. That is, the deputies of the new convocation honestly satisfied their obligations to the parties that nominated them. The latest changes in 2016 raised this price to 152 rubles,27 which is 304 times higher than the price in the original version of the law.

Yes, of course, many countries prefer state financial support for political parties in order to avoid their dependence on sponsors. True, the state does not always take on the constant financing of the life of parties. Some countries (Germany and the USA) partially finance only the campaign expenses of parties.28 But of all the main methods of direct state financing of parties, only one, used in Russia and Latvia, seriously discriminates against the participants in the electoral process.29

Thus, in matters of financing the election campaign, a situation of deliberately unequal position of various parties participating in the elections was created. The favorite parties receive direct financial support from the state in proportion to their results in the last elections. The support mechanism is embodied in the legislation on political parties, but is tied to their participation in elections.

The principle of equality of candidates and electoral associations turned out to be limited by law in the field of election campaigning as well. The Law “On the Procedure for Covering the Activities of Public Authorities in State Mass Media,” which has been in force for more than 20 years, makes it possible to disseminate information about candidates holding public office without the restrictions provided for election campaigning by other candidates.

Another limitation of the principle of equality of election participants in matters of campaigning concerns the right to free airtime and print space. According to the law, until 2009, any electoral associations could receive such time andprint space. After 2009, a special amendment to the electoral law introduced a rule that associations that did not receive a certain percentage of votes in previous elections (less than 3%)30 can be deprived of this right. Thus, only the mechanism of paid publications and broadcasts was left for them.

As a result, provisions were introduced into the legal regulation of pre-election campaigning, creating deliberately unequal conditions for less popular parties and opposition candidates, and conditions were created for the dominance of information by candidate officials. At the same time, their opponents are deprived not only of similarly wide opportunities for campaigning, but also of the possibility of effective counter-campaigning.

Creation of a system of control over the activities of election commissions

The third group of amendments is aimed at creating a system of control over the activities of election commissions, that is, the organizations responsible for organizing and conducting elections.

Formally, from the point of view of the law, election commissions are neither bodies of state power nor bodies of local self-government, but are participatory bodies formed jointly by the state and society.31 The rules for their formation are determined by the state. Thus, the state is relatively free in choosing one of the two principles of their formation—“from above,” when a certain part of the composition of the commission is appointed directly by state authorities and local governments or higher commissions, or “from below,” when members of election commissions are nominated by meetings of voters, political parties and public associations. Giving priority to the principle of formation “from above,” the state thus increases the share of members administratively dependent on it in the composition of commissions. In addition, the state can assume the authority to approve candidates nominated “from below.”

This is exactly what happened to the Russian election commissions. Contrary to the law, according to which “election commissions, when preparing and holding elections, within the limits of their competence, are independent of state authorities and local self-government bodies” (clause 12, article 20 of the Federal Law “On Basic Guarantees…”), the formation of commissions at various levels was gradually placed in complete dependence on the authorities. For example, the formation of election commissions of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation is carried out half by the regional legislative (representative) body, half by the highest official of the region (head of the highest executive authority of the subject).32 As a result, the current status of election commissions has allowed a number of scholars to directly categorize them as belonging to the political executive authorities that manage the electoral process.33

As a result, the state almost completely controls the procedure for the formation of election commissions at all levels, and the political basis for their activities is contained from the outset in the procedure for their formation, since “the personnel composition of the commissions is determined by the political component of the representative and executive bodies that take part in their formation.”34

But it was not only the formation procedure that brought the status of election commissions closer to state authorities. The commissions, primarily the highest ones (Central and regional), were entrusted with separate governmental powers. Thus, since 2005, the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation has been entrusted with the authority to collect and verify all consolidated financial statements of political parties.35 At the regional level, the election commissions of the subjects of the Federation were endowed with similar powers in relation to the regional branches of political parties.36 In addition, the law assigned regulatory functions to the election commissions to determine the manner of a number of electoral procedures (three-day voting under quarantine conditions, remote electronic voting, etc.). The legislator decided that operational legal regulation in changing political conditions is easier and more efficient to entrust to supervisory bodies, by giving them the corresponding rights.

At the same time, while increasing the powers to control parties outside the electoral process, the supervisory powers directly related to the elections were reduced. So, back in 2004, the Central Election Commission was deprived of the right to appeal to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation with complaints about decisions, and actions and inactions related to the massive violation of the rights of voters. It is precisely those violations that the Central Election Commission, as a commission organizing federal elections and heading the system of election commissions, could most accurately and promptly identify and stop. Thus, the powers to suppress mass violations were actually completely transferred to the prosecutor’s office of the Russian Federation, which only increased the possibility of influence on the electoral process by state authorities. In addition to this, the obligation of the commission to consider at its meetings dissenting opinions prepared by members who disagree with the decisions of the commission was excluded. Now their role has become purely formal, and their preparation no longer entails any legal consequences.37

Restriction of society’s ability to exercise oversight of the electoral process and protect violated rights

The fourth group of amendments is aimed at limiting the ability of society to exercise oversight over the electoral process and protect violated rights. To be less polite, these amendments are intended to make the fight against fraud more difficult and provide additional opportunities for fraud. They relate to various forms of monitoring and observation of elections at all stages of the election campaign. First of all, we are talking about the subject composition of the observers, about their powers, about the forms of interaction with election commissions, and with the state and with local self-government. Secondly, we are talking about the legal consequences of illegal actions of the state during election campaigns. And this is also understandable—if the state is interested in obtaining a certain result different from the real one in the elections, it will strive to minimize the possibilities of public observers and to complicate their activities.

With the adoption of the Law “On Elections of Deputies…” of 2005, public associations were deprived of the right to independently appoint observers,38 and without it, such associations were made dependent on parties and candidates pursuing their own goals in the framework of election campaigns, or were forced to use other methods of oversight. For example, to send their representatives to polling stations as employees of the media, who, however, have a relatively limited arsenal of rights related directly to monitoring.

But even having the status of media workers, representatives of monitoring associations were able to quite effectively record violations. The response of the state was the complication of the procedure for appointing persons exercising such oversight. Since 2015, a requirement was introduced: a future media representative at a polling station must work for that particular publication for at least six months. Public observers were forced to form a corps of their representatives far in advance, whereas previously a media representative could be appointed and sent to the polling station directly on voting day.

An ambiguous situation has developed with the powers of observers. Even granting them certain rights, the legislator limited them with a variety of limitations. For example, in 2016, the Law “On Basic Guarantees…” of 2002 finally included the right of an observer to take video and to photograph at a polling station. However, it can be carried out only after prior notification of the chairman, deputy chairman or secretary of the commission. And only from the place that the chairman of the commission determines.39

The introduction of a single voting day is also one of the measures that has the hidden goal of complicating public oversight. When elections are held simultaneously throughout the country in different regions, the effectiveness of observation is reduced due to the quantitative shortage of observers, the dispersion of their attention, the accessibility by transport of locations to be observed, and the simultaneous increase in the amount of information about violations that has to be analyzed within strictly allotted procedural deadlines. The possibilities for monitoring and protecting violated rights were significantly undermined by the introduction in 2020–2021 of extended three-day voting (voting “on stumps”) and the introduction of remote electronic voting in certain regions. The three-day vote was first introduced as a single instance during the pandemic when voting for amendments to the Constitution in the summer of 2020. As we have already said, the determination of the manner of this voting was delegated by the CEC. And, apparently, its results turned out to be so obviously impressive for the authorities that it was decided to extend the practice to the next elections, and on the same regulatory terms. Remote electronic voting, which we will certainly talk about separately, was tested in the elections to the Moscow City Duma in 2019 and repeated in the elections to the Duma in 2021. It was in 2021 that the use of remote electronic voting caused a huge scandal, since the results of electronic and paper voting turned out to be completely opposite from one another. Because of its lack of transparency and lack of adequate oversight, remote electronic voting has been heavily criticized and its continued use questioned. The issue has not yet been resolved, but it is quite likely that the aggravation of the internal political situation may, on the contrary, lead to the mass introduction of remote electronic voting as an ideal way for the authorities to achieve the desired electoral result in the absence of proper control of the system.

Thus, a whole range of measures aimed at limiting the possibilities of public oversight was built into the Russian electoral legislation.

Manipulation of the Rules of determination of election results

The fifth group of amendments concerns the rules for determining the results of elections— the choice of an electoral formula through which the votes of voters are transformed into deputy mandates. Unfortunately, any electoral formula to some extent distorts the results of the expression of will, and the task of democratic legislation is to smooth out this problem as much as possible. However, in Russia, a group of amendments, on the contrary, is aimed precisely at using the hidden properties of various electoral formulas in the interests of certain candidates and parties. At the same time, both a complete change in the formula and the introduction of minor changes in it can create conditions for a completely legal redistribution of mandates between the winners.

For many years, the electoral formula in the formation of the personal composition of the State Duma deputies remained unchanged—half of the deputies were elected in single-member districts according to the majority system of the relative majority, and the other half were elected in the federal district, according to the proportional system, using the Hare quota, the largest remainder rule and 5% threshold. At the same time, the formation of blocs between different electoral associations was allowed. The turnout threshold was set at 25% of the number of voters. The ballots contained the line “against all.” These are the main elements of the formula used from 1993 to 2003. In subsequent years, all of them were change done way or another.

With the adoption of the Law “On the Election of Deputies…” in 2005, a fully proportional electoral system was introduced in Russia using the Hare quota and the rule of the largest remainder, although there were proposals to switch to the Imperiali quota method. In itself, the rejection of single-member districts meant a complete transition to party elections and fit into the logic of reducing political competition, increasing state control over elections, and ensuring a parliamentary majority for the party in power.

After the exclusion from the electoral process of all public associations except for political parties, and a several-fold reduction in the number of the latter, the voters’ options were sharply reduced: only a very limited number of options remained on the ballot. Under these conditions, the use of the Hare quota in the distribution of mandates strengthened the advantage of the favorite party. True, more radical proposals were also voiced within the walls of the parliament: on the transition to the use of the Imperiali quota method, which frankly contributes to an even greater increase in the result of the leading party at the expense of “outsiders.” But, as already mentioned, on the scale of the parliament, consisting of 450 deputies, this method was recognized as insufficiently effective.

In 2014, the electoral system was changed again. The authorities were forced to return a mixed system with single-mandate constituencies, since with a sharp decline in the rating of the ruling party, maintaining fully proportional elections threatened it with the loss of the parliamentary majority. And vice versa, in combination with single-mandate elections with a fully built vertical of election commissions, it guaranteed the preservation and possibly even an increase in the number of deputy mandates.

The independent mixed system, in which the results of single-seat elections are not taken into account in determining the results of elections under the proportional system, but are simply added to them, contributed to this goal to the maximum, and it was successfully achieved. As a result, the ruling party received 76.22% of the seats in the State Duma with 54.2% of the votes on party lists. That is, the use of the features of the electoral system in specific political conditions gave a total distortion of the representativeness of the parliament of 22%.

The size of the threshold has also been subject to repeated changes over several electoral cycles. Thus, even the Law “On Elections of Deputies…” of 2002 stipulated that the next elections after the nearest elections in 2007 would be held using a 7% threshold. The Law “On Elections of Deputies…” of 2005 confirmed this. The increase in the size of the threshold was directly related to the task of limiting competition in elections, since it was aimed at removing a number of political actors from the pre-election process. The increased threshold was supposed to guarantee that relatively small parties that retained state registration after the party reform did not get into the State Duma. As a result, only four parties overcame the threshold, which for many years remained the only parliamentary parties, but at the same time did not at all reflect the entire palette of the country’s political life.

In subsequent years, after the decision of the ECtHR in the case of the Republican Party v. Russia, in which the value of the threshold was called into question, certain reservations were introduced to this value—the rules on the so-called preferential mandates for parties that did not overcome the barrier, but nevertheless gained a significant number of votes. Thus, one mandate was given to a party that received from 5 to 6% of the vote, and two mandates to a party that received from 6 to 7%. The transfer of one or two mandates on the scale of a deputy corps of 450 people was absolutely meaningless, but at least somehow imitated democratic procedures. However, these provisions have never been used. In 2014, the threshold was returned to the level of 5%, however, when returning to a mixed independent system, such a measure no longer posed any significant risks for the favorite party.

As we see, all these groups of amendments achieved their goal to such an extent that the Chairman of the Constitutional Court of Russia, in a public speech in the press, was forced to speak about the need to restore the situation “so that the opposition has a real opportunity to come to power within the framework of the Constitution, that is, on principles of fair political competition.”40 The electoral legislation, which by definition is the key to democracy, has fully demonstrated its reverse anti-democratic properties, subject to certain goals and objectives of the authorities.

Near-electoral amendments

The sixth group is near-electoral amendments. This is another very important group of amendments, the names of which are not directly associated with elections, but restrict the tools of democracy and the principle of change of power. We are talking about extending the terms of office of the president and parliament, restricting the right to a referendum, redistributing jurisdiction in favor of one of the branches of power, lifting restrictions on the number of elections of a senior official, and complicating the procedures for applying to constitutional justice. The group includes mainly constitutional amendments and amendments to federal constitutional laws directly related to elections or other types of voting, which are openly authoritarian in nature. The adoption of such amendments is characteristic of periods of retention of power, when the adjustment of electoral norms alone is not enough to achieve the goal.

Perhaps our classification will be useful not only to scholars. It happens that the criterion of authoritarian amendments to legislation as a marker of changes in the political regime turns out to be important for the entire population. Even if these amendments do not bear very frank signs of the seizure or retention of power. Such a marker usually works without any special classification, but only if there is a serious authoritarian inoculation, when the population develops natural counter-authoritarian antibodies and the social organism automatically rejects any, even the weakest signs of restrictions on the change of power.

It happens. And here the quite recent (2017) situation in Paraguay is indicative. The Constitution of the Republic contains Article 229, according to which the President holds office for five years, and this period cannot be extended. Such an article appeared after the 34-year rule of the dictator A. Stroessner as an important guarantee against a return to authoritarianism. In 2016, a constitutional amendment was proposed to deputies of both houses of Congress, at the suggestion of the former and current presidents, giving the right to the President (and vice president) to run for a second time in a row or after skipping one presidential term. On the night of March 31, 2017, the vote on the amendment took place in a closed session of the Senate. Twenty-five senators out of 45 voted for the amendment.

The next morning, the news of the night vote caused an outburst of indignation. Demonstrators surrounded the Congress building in Asuncion, broke through the police cordon and set fire to the parliament. The unrest spread to other parts of the country and lasted almost a week. As a result, the amendment was blocked and repealed.